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	<title>Comments for ha.ckers.org web application security lab</title>
	<link>http://ha.ckers.org/blog</link>
	<description>Web Application Security Blog</description>
	<pubDate>Fri, 19 Mar 2010 11:56:08 +0000</pubDate>

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		<title>Comment on Effectiveness of User Training&#8230; and Security Products in General by Picci</title>
		<link>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100317/effectiveness-of-user-training-and-security-products-in-general/#comment-123890</link>
		<author>Picci</author>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Mar 2010 23:27:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100317/effectiveness-of-user-training-and-security-products-in-general/#comment-123890</guid>
					<description>I get certificate warnings on microsoft sites all the time. (too many  subdomains and nobody fixing certificates i guess)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I get certificate warnings on microsoft sites all the time. (too many  subdomains and nobody fixing certificates i guess)</p>
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		<title>Comment on Using Parameter Pollution and Clickjacking to Aid Anti-CSRF Bypass by p0deje</title>
		<link>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100311/using-parameter-pollution-and-clickjacking-to-aid-anti-csrf-bypass/#comment-123873</link>
		<author>p0deje</author>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Mar 2010 15:59:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100311/using-parameter-pollution-and-clickjacking-to-aid-anti-csrf-bypass/#comment-123873</guid>
					<description>Argh, I was wrong. ClearClick protects your keyboard hits also and my "bypass" was just a same-domain design idea.
It seems that NoScript will save you
:)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Argh, I was wrong. ClearClick protects your keyboard hits also and my &#8220;bypass&#8221; was just a same-domain design idea.<br />
It seems that NoScript will save you<br />
 <img src='http://ha.ckers.org/blog/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':)' class='wp-smiley' /></p>
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		<title>Comment on Effectiveness of User Training&#8230; and Security Products in General by AppSec</title>
		<link>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100317/effectiveness-of-user-training-and-security-products-in-general/#comment-123859</link>
		<author>AppSec</author>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Mar 2010 12:38:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100317/effectiveness-of-user-training-and-security-products-in-general/#comment-123859</guid>
					<description>Argh..  Lack of sleeping is making brain and fingers not work correctly.. Sorry for the typos :-/.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Argh..  Lack of sleeping is making brain and fingers not work correctly.. Sorry for the typos :-/.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Effectiveness of User Training&#8230; and Security Products in General by AppSec</title>
		<link>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100317/effectiveness-of-user-training-and-security-products-in-general/#comment-123858</link>
		<author>AppSec</author>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Mar 2010 12:37:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100317/effectiveness-of-user-training-and-security-products-in-general/#comment-123858</guid>
					<description>@Wladimir: "Any other security solution that constantly requires user’s attention is equally badly designed and only suitable for geeks who value their security higher than this time loss."  

Yep, and that's why I made the comment up top, because any truly ease solution requires someone to give up information which they would then perceive as a loss of privacy or control.

@RSnake:  "concur it would happen more often but so much so that it’s worth the cost of having them? "

Isnt' that the same as saying that if we didn't have the education that we have about security that the potential is there for more atacks  -- you don't have proof that their wouldn't be..  That it would be more efficient for attackers so their costs would go down because consumers would be less responsible?  (this is all things being equal -- meaning that the state of security is what it is today, not some ideal situation).  I mean, let's take password complexity for example:  the paper says this is a waste because if you have lock outs, then there's no need to have the complexity.  But if you have those lockouts, then you can have a mass denial of service attack.  If you have soft lockouts, then you customer confusion (I'm sorry, but soft lockouts are a waste in my mind).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@Wladimir: &#8220;Any other security solution that constantly requires user’s attention is equally badly designed and only suitable for geeks who value their security higher than this time loss.&#8221;  </p>
<p>Yep, and that&#8217;s why I made the comment up top, because any truly ease solution requires someone to give up information which they would then perceive as a loss of privacy or control.</p>
<p>@RSnake:  &#8220;concur it would happen more often but so much so that it’s worth the cost of having them? &#8221;</p>
<p>Isnt&#8217; that the same as saying that if we didn&#8217;t have the education that we have about security that the potential is there for more atacks  &#8212; you don&#8217;t have proof that their wouldn&#8217;t be..  That it would be more efficient for attackers so their costs would go down because consumers would be less responsible?  (this is all things being equal &#8212; meaning that the state of security is what it is today, not some ideal situation).  I mean, let&#8217;s take password complexity for example:  the paper says this is a waste because if you have lock outs, then there&#8217;s no need to have the complexity.  But if you have those lockouts, then you can have a mass denial of service attack.  If you have soft lockouts, then you customer confusion (I&#8217;m sorry, but soft lockouts are a waste in my mind).</p>
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		<title>Comment on Facebook Patents Social Feeds and I Patent XSS by avetis.kazarian</title>
		<link>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100226/facebook-patents-social-feeds-and-i-patent-xss/#comment-123855</link>
		<author>avetis.kazarian</author>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Mar 2010 11:59:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100226/facebook-patents-social-feeds-and-i-patent-xss/#comment-123855</guid>
					<description>Ha Ha Ha !

Just GREAT.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ha Ha Ha !</p>
<p>Just GREAT.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Using Parameter Pollution and Clickjacking to Aid Anti-CSRF Bypass by p0deje</title>
		<link>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100311/using-parameter-pollution-and-clickjacking-to-aid-anti-csrf-bypass/#comment-123851</link>
		<author>p0deje</author>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Mar 2010 11:32:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100311/using-parameter-pollution-and-clickjacking-to-aid-anti-csrf-bypass/#comment-123851</guid>
					<description>@ Tom T.

As far as I remember, NoScript doesn't block iFrames and Frames by default, but I maybe wrong.

ClearClick is cool thing, but it can be bypassed (it seems that I've found a way, but gotta test more). And more, it saves only your clicks, not your keyboard hits. So you may trick user with something like "Click Tab and hit Enter to download this video"

So, I think, NoScript doesn't 100% bullet proof by default. But if you block all iframes, objects etc. for all trusted sites, I suppose you will be safe.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@ Tom T.</p>
<p>As far as I remember, NoScript doesn&#8217;t block iFrames and Frames by default, but I maybe wrong.</p>
<p>ClearClick is cool thing, but it can be bypassed (it seems that I&#8217;ve found a way, but gotta test more). And more, it saves only your clicks, not your keyboard hits. So you may trick user with something like &#8220;Click Tab and hit Enter to download this video&#8221;</p>
<p>So, I think, NoScript doesn&#8217;t 100% bullet proof by default. But if you block all iframes, objects etc. for all trusted sites, I suppose you will be safe.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Effectiveness of User Training&#8230; and Security Products in General by Jawdy</title>
		<link>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100317/effectiveness-of-user-training-and-security-products-in-general/#comment-123841</link>
		<author>Jawdy</author>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Mar 2010 09:01:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100317/effectiveness-of-user-training-and-security-products-in-general/#comment-123841</guid>
					<description>Ultimate deterrent, get Terry Tate - Office Linebacker, and just shift his job roll to include slamming folks for not paying attention to their browser security ;-)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ultimate deterrent, get Terry Tate - Office Linebacker, and just shift his job roll to include slamming folks for not paying attention to their browser security <img src='http://ha.ckers.org/blog/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_wink.gif' alt=';-)' class='wp-smiley' /></p>
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		<title>Comment on Effectiveness of User Training&#8230; and Security Products in General by Wladimir Palant</title>
		<link>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100317/effectiveness-of-user-training-and-security-products-in-general/#comment-123833</link>
		<author>Wladimir Palant</author>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Mar 2010 07:34:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100317/effectiveness-of-user-training-and-security-products-in-general/#comment-123833</guid>
					<description>@RSnake: Btw, your math is wrong. An anti-phishing solution isn't wasting 2 seconds of user's time to download lists - any properly designed application will do that in background without bothering the user. It is mostly the warnings it might display that are wasting user's time. Which is why "classic" personal firewalls make no sense whatsoever - they consistently nag the user with warnings ("Do you want to allow foo.exe to access port 12345?") without providing an equivalent value. Any other security solution that constantly requires user's attention is equally badly designed and only suitable for geeks who value their security higher than this time loss.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@RSnake: Btw, your math is wrong. An anti-phishing solution isn&#8217;t wasting 2 seconds of user&#8217;s time to download lists - any properly designed application will do that in background without bothering the user. It is mostly the warnings it might display that are wasting user&#8217;s time. Which is why &#8220;classic&#8221; personal firewalls make no sense whatsoever - they consistently nag the user with warnings (&#8221;Do you want to allow foo.exe to access port 12345?&#8221;) without providing an equivalent value. Any other security solution that constantly requires user&#8217;s attention is equally badly designed and only suitable for geeks who value their security higher than this time loss.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Effectiveness of User Training&#8230; and Security Products in General by Wladimir Palant</title>
		<link>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100317/effectiveness-of-user-training-and-security-products-in-general/#comment-123832</link>
		<author>Wladimir Palant</author>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Mar 2010 07:26:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100317/effectiveness-of-user-training-and-security-products-in-general/#comment-123832</guid>
					<description>@RSnake: You are late to the party, I read that article months ago :)

@thrill: Actually, OK'ing the warning in Firefox is everything but simple - the chance that unexperienced users will ever do that is rather low. And that's a good thing, it puts some pressure on the websites to fix their certificates. If an app absolutely cannot do without self-signed certificates, it should at least use a root certificate that only needs to be imported once. With some luck, certificate warnings (which are still very common) will become rare enough that any user hitting one will stop and think twice (thrice) before continuing.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@RSnake: You are late to the party, I read that article months ago <img src='http://ha.ckers.org/blog/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':)' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
<p>@thrill: Actually, OK&#8217;ing the warning in Firefox is everything but simple - the chance that unexperienced users will ever do that is rather low. And that&#8217;s a good thing, it puts some pressure on the websites to fix their certificates. If an app absolutely cannot do without self-signed certificates, it should at least use a root certificate that only needs to be imported once. With some luck, certificate warnings (which are still very common) will become rare enough that any user hitting one will stop and think twice (thrice) before continuing.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Effectiveness of User Training&#8230; and Security Products in General by thrill</title>
		<link>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100317/effectiveness-of-user-training-and-security-products-in-general/#comment-123810</link>
		<author>thrill</author>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Mar 2010 01:41:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20100317/effectiveness-of-user-training-and-security-products-in-general/#comment-123810</guid>
					<description>You know what guys, you're just scaring the people.. I don't need any browser security, my company has a firewall.. that's all we really need.

oh.. wait.. this is the real world? wuh?

@fahadsadah - yes, the club is a deterrent for honest people, but guess what, thieves that are determined to own your (insert rare vehicle here) don't care about the club.. there's dozens upon dozens of ways to subvert them, just like the silly security warnings that no one, except for security people, pay attention to.. and even in those cases, if we were to read that someone's certificate was 'self signed' there's a good chance we'd still OK it on firefox.. so what's the use?

--thrill</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You know what guys, you&#8217;re just scaring the people.. I don&#8217;t need any browser security, my company has a firewall.. that&#8217;s all we really need.</p>
<p>oh.. wait.. this is the real world? wuh?</p>
<p>@fahadsadah - yes, the club is a deterrent for honest people, but guess what, thieves that are determined to own your (insert rare vehicle here) don&#8217;t care about the club.. there&#8217;s dozens upon dozens of ways to subvert them, just like the silly security warnings that no one, except for security people, pay attention to.. and even in those cases, if we were to read that someone&#8217;s certificate was &#8217;self signed&#8217; there&#8217;s a good chance we&#8217;d still OK it on firefox.. so what&#8217;s the use?</p>
<p>&#8211;thrill</p>
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